Thailand's military government plays a new diplomatic game

[dozer]

Washington has recognized that there are new players in Thai politics who are not aligned with the traditional elite, and has diversified its policy accordingly -- -------

http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopo ... matic-game

It has been just over a year since the Thai military staged a coup following the ouster by the courts of elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Many Western countries continue to impose sanctions against the junta, calling for the restoration of democracy and respect for human rights. But their interventionism risks pushing Bangkok closer to China, and potentially prolonging military rule.


Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha talks to reporters at Government House in Bangkok on May 15. © AP
Close Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha talks to reporters at Government House in Bangkok on May 15. © AP
The U.S., arguably Thailand's most important ally, implemented an "interventionist policy" shortly after the coup by suspending $4.7 million in financial assistance to the Thai army. The U.S. also excluded Thailand from an international maritime exercise held in June 2014, and downgraded Thailand's Cobra Gold event, the largest annual military exercise in the Asia Pacific region.

Other democratic nations and organizations took tougher action against the junta. The European Union, for example, froze bilateral cooperation, suspended all official visits to and from Thailand, halted the implementation of a broad partnership and cooperation agreement, and shelved talks on a trade deal.

Amid these punitive measures, the junta found some comfort in Chinese friendship. Shortly after the coup, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, then army commander and coup leader and now prime minister, was photographed shaking hands with Chinese businessmen, illustrating the government's apparent belief that China could be used to offset the impact of Western sanctions.

So far, China has responded favorably to the Thai approaches. Presenting itself as impartial in Thailand's internal conflicts, China makes no pretense of promoting human rights or democracy. This firm posture is helpful to the junta, which knows that China will not promote internal dissent by seeking political reforms.

Thailand and China established diplomatic relations in 1975. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, the two countries formed a loose military alignment against the communists in Indochina. Since then, bilateral relations have remained healthy thanks to the absence of territorial disputes, firm ties between the Thai royal family and the Chinese leadership, and the influence of Thailand's well-integrated ethnic Chinese community.

A Sino-Thai trade agreement, the first between China and a member of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations, took effect on Oct. 1, 2003. Thailand has since then developed a military relationship with China that is beginning to resemble its security ties with the U.S. Since the early 1980s, Bangkok has purchased American armaments and military-related equipment under this partnership at "friendship prices." Sino-Thai military links, meanwhile, are among the most developed in the region -- second only to those of Myanmar, China's quasi-ally.

Many cabinet ministers and powerful businesses in Thailand have significant investments in China. Thailand's Charoen Pokphand Group, one of Southeast Asia's largest companies, has been doing business in China since 1949. Thai and Chinese conglomerates regularly exchange high-level visits and share business information. Increasing numbers of Thai students are learning Mandarin, prompting Beijing to dispatch a large number of language teachers to Thailand.

Beijing steals a march

Overall, U.S. interventionism seems to have pushed Thailand further into the Chinese orbit. China's non-interference policy and its concentration on making money rather than enemies have helped it steal a march on Western countries in the wake of the coup, allowing it to pull ahead in the subtle but intensifying competition for increased influence in Thailand.

While some Thai political players are watching the U.S. with suspicious eyes, most appear comfortable with China's position. Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan, deputy prime minister and defense minister, recently paid a visit to Beijing to strengthen bilateral ties. As a result, China was invited to invest in Thailand's high-speed train and other infrastructure projects -- although amid intense lobbying from Japanese and other companies, the projects have since become something of a political football ground.

China's pragmatism has also proven effective in cementing its relations with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The U.S., meanwhile, continues to goad the Thai leadership with interventionist comments. In January, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel visited Thailand and urged the military government to lift martial law and to return power to the Thai people.

Russel's remarks infuriated the generals, who see the U.S. focus on democracy and human rights as a departure from Washington's Cold War support for the military, the bureaucracy and the royal family as allies against communism. However, the U.S. clearly understands that this alliance has weakened following changes in the Thai political landscape in recent years.

Washington has recognized that there are new players in Thai politics who are not aligned with the traditional elite, and has diversified its policy accordingly -- reaching out to the so-called "red shirt" supporters of Yingluck and her brother Thaksin, also a former prime minister. In effect, the U.S. is betting that its interventionist stance in favor of democracy will be a better long-term bet in Thailand than Beijing's pragmatic support of the militarized status quo.

This is a high-stakes game for both Washington, which risks "losing Thailand" to China, and Bangkok, which may in the end find that life as a client of Beijing is both less comfortable and less effective than its alliance with the U.S.

For example, there are question marks over whether China can provide the international legitimacy that the U.S. has given Thailand; whether it can guarantee Thailand's security; and whether it can sustain the appearance of neutrality in the Thai conflict while doing business with the military government.

In a broader context, a closer Sino-Thai relationship may also affect regional stability, especially if it encourages the formation of an alliance of non-democratic regimes, which would represent a dark hole at the heart of Southeast Asia. Worse, Chinese support for the Thai junta may strengthen its position and instill a degree of confidence that could prolong its rule despite international condemnation. That would be both a perverse outcome of Western interventionism and a tragedy for Thailand.